Sticking to an outdated worldview is a universal risk, especially in times of rapid change, and one of the most dangerous. The war in Ukraine is a striking example of this. In just a few years, the battlefield has undergone a complete reinvention: drones are ubiquitous, information is available in real time, and responses occur within minutes. Military certainties that had been solid for decades became obsolete overnight. In a rapidly and unpredictably changing world, the ability to question one’s models is not just a competitive advantage; it’s a matter of survival. This places new demands on strategic thinking for military staff and organizations alike.
© French Army
In May 2025, NATO conducted an exercise called “Hedgehog 2025” in Estonia with 16,000 troops from 12 countries, including 1,000 French troops. The exercise went badly; the Ukrainian team, playing the role of the enemy, destroyed two NATO battalions (around 2,000 troops) in just half a day. A commander who was present and observed the disaster unfold summed up the episode: “We’re screwed.” The Wall Street Journal concluded, charitably: “NATO has seen the future, and it is not prepared for it.” Oops.
The war in Ukraine has completely changed the landscape. Faced with a massive attack, Ukrainians developed a management system based on real-time information as close to the events as possible. Reaction time is now measured in minutes. This system’s models are transparency in the field (drones make hiding impossible; every movement is instantly detected, and a response follows within minutes), the centrality of real-time information (and its circulation so it can be captured and disseminated where it can be exploited), and constant adaptation of tactics because any gains usually don’t last long. In contrast, NATO’s doctrines and organizational methods are designed for slow, massive wars. This model dates back to the 1980s, when a Russian breakthrough through Germany was anticipated. With its obsolete models, NATO is well behind the times. While NATO trained the Ukrainians at the start of the war in Ukraine, the opposite is now true. The Ukrainian army is undoubtedly the most modern in the world and will train us.
Locked into its models
The fiasco of “Hedgehog 2025” illustrates the major risk of remaining locked into one’s models in times of change. This lock-in is all the stronger because the models are generally invisible—they are obvious only to those who hold them. The actor’s sense of superiority also plays an important role in reinforcing blindness. The low esteem in which the Russian army is held, given its setbacks in Ukraine, undoubtedly hinders reflection and is therefore a deadly trap. Periods of war are revolutionary in that models that have been solid for years can be called into question. Ukraine is a new example of this. However, it is difficult to know whether the lesson of “Hedgehog 2025” has been learned. The fiasco has undoubtedly left a lasting impression, but whether it has led to real change remains to be seen. One of the strengths of models is that they withstand failures seen as aberrations. These are the famous arguments of “Yes, but this is different” or “That doesn’t count,” which are laughable when used by children but which adults also readily employ. Except when we are faced with a catastrophe—but then it is too late- models are stronger than facts. This is the limitation of passive learning. Contrary to what we might think, facts rarely lead us to change our models. In fact, they are generally filtered by them. Their role is precisely to filter out information deemed useless.
In a rapidly and profoundly changing world, particularly one that is challenging long-held beliefs, the ability to question our models is becoming a condition for survival. What are our models on this subject? How are they relevant and useful? How are they obsolete and dangerous? We must integrate these questions into strategic thinking. For that, we must be able to make them visible. This requires abandoning all forms of arrogance in favor of epistemic modesty. It also means putting organizational and managerial mechanisms in place so this questioning becomes a systematic and collective approach rather than the work of isolated individuals who are easily ostracized.
There’s a catch
Of course, there’s a catch. The lesson cannot simply be that we need to adapt our models quickly and not remain locked into them. This is already difficult to achieve, but it is not enough. Nor should the lesson be that Ukrainians should teach us a new military strategy, even though that would obviously be useful. The next war will not be like the one in Ukraine. No war is like the one before it. By sticking to a paradigm of adaptation only, we risk always being one war behind. We must prepare for new eventualities and anticipate that our models may become obsolete overnight. The only way to do so is to maintain a pool of alternative models that can be implemented when dominant models fail.
This is what the French army did before World War I. In the years leading up to the war, the military experimented with new weapons, technologies, and organizational forms. These experiments were not official and even called official doctrine into question, but they were tolerated, and experimentation was widespread. Examples include the use of bicycles for much faster and more discreet communications, new rifles, new powders, airships, reconnaissance and artillery support aircraft, gun protection, and modes of attack. When the failure of official doctrine became apparent in the early months of the war, all these innovations were implemented on a large scale, sometimes in record time.
Thinking about strategy in terms of models
Identifying your models, training yourself to question them systematically, being ready to change them quickly, and nurturing a pool of alternative models are the new imperatives of strategy in a world of profound, rapid, and unexpected change.
🔎 Sources: Wall Street Journal article: NATO has seen the future ans is unprepared + article from OpexNews and Nicolas M on X (in French).
🇫🇷 A version in French of this article is available here.
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